Drug Interdiction

(Interdiction - HIDTA definition) "The HIDTA [High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area] program, originally authorized by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690),¹⁵⁵ provides assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement operating in areas deemed as the most-impacted by drug trafficking. Each HIDTA is governed by a separate executive board comprised of about eight federal agencies and eight state or local agencies. The program’s main goals are to

• assess regional drug threats;
• develop strategies focusing efforts on combating drug trafficking threats;
• create and fund initiatives to improve these strategies;
• facilitate coordination between federal, state, and local efforts; and
• produce efficient drug control efforts to reduce/eliminate the impact of drug trafficking.¹⁵⁶

"The Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) has the authority to designate areas within the United States and its territories that are centers of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution as HIDTAs—of which there are currently 28."

(interdiction - drug enforcement agencies) "Drug-related activities in the United States span a number of agencies. In addition to the DoD [Department of Defense] activities focused on drug trafficking discussed previously, a range of programs involving intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing are in place at a number of levels. The central actor in counternarcotics and, therefore, domestic intelligence activities in this area is the DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration]. The agency’s Intelligence Division manages a number of offices and programs that interface both with other agencies in the intelligence community (e.g., the division’s National Security Intelligence Section) and operations to support state and local law enforcement activities (such as Operation Pipeline, which provides training, communication, and analytic support to local law enforcement targeting private motor vehicles involved in drug trafficking, and Operation Convoy, its commercial vehicle counterpart). The Intelligence Division manages information fusion centers. For example, the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is the major hub for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating drug related intelligence for all levels of law enforcement and government. It covers drug, alien, and weapon smuggling, as well as terrorism-related smuggling. To support state and local operations, the DEA has organized Mobile Enforcement Teams (METs) to assist state and local law enforcement facing particularly difficult drug-enforcement challenges. When requested by state and local law enforcement, the DEA will send a team to assist in investigation, intelligence collection and analysis, arrests, and prosecution."

(violence in drug law enforcement) "Based on the available English language scientific evidence, the results of this systematic review suggest that an increase in drug law enforcement interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely to reduce violence attributable to drug gangs. Instead, from an evidence-based public policy perspective and based on several decades of available data, the existing evidence strongly suggests that drug law enforcement contributes to gun violence and high homicide rates and that increasingly sophisticated methods of disrupting organizations involved in drug distribution could unintentionally increase violence. In this context, and since drug prohibition has not achieved its stated goal of reducing drug supply, alternative models for drug control may need to be considered if drug-related violence is to be meaningfully reduced."

(militarization of law enforcement) "Over the last 25 years, America has seen a disturbing militarization of its civilian law enforcement, along with a dramatic and unsettling rise in the use of paramilitary police units (most commonly called Special Weapons and Tactics, or SWAT) for routine police work. The most common use of SWAT teams today is to serve narcotics warrants, usually with forced, unannounced entry into the home.

"These increasingly frequent raids, 40,000 per year by one estimate, are needlessly subjecting nonviolent drug offenders, bystanders, and wrongly targeted civilians to the terror of having their homes invaded while they’re sleeping, usually by teams of heavily armed paramilitary units dressed not as police officers but as soldiers. These raids bring unnecessary violence and provocation to nonviolent drug offenders, many of whom were guilty of only misdemeanors. The raids terrorize innocents when police mistakenly target the wrong residence. And they have resulted in dozens of needless deaths and injuries, not only of drug offenders, but also of police officers, children, bystanders, and innocent suspects."

(human influence on drug detection dogs) "The overwhelming number of incorrect alerts [by drug and/or explosive detection dogs] identified across conditions confirms that handler beliefs affect performance. Further, the directed pattern of alerts in conditions containing a marker compared with the pattern of alerts in the condition with unmarked decoy scent suggests that human influence on handler beliefs affects alerts to a greater degree than dog influence on handler beliefs."

"In conclusion, these findings confirm that handler beliefs affect working dog outcomes, and human indication of scent location affects distribution of alerts more than dog interest in a particular location."

(drug production and law enforcement seizures) One of the major problems with supply reduction efforts (source control, interdiction, and domestic enforcement) is that, "Free entry into the cocaine business, at all levels, allows suppliers to expand to cover the loses due to seizures.⁸ ... suppliers simply produce for the market what they would have produced anyway plus enough extra to cover anticipated government seizures."

(Canada - United States border) "Through successful binational fora such as the Cross-Border Crime Forum (CBCF) and Project North Star, the United States and Canada have increased intelligence-sharing and joint training opportunities for law enforcement officials. Investigative cooperation has also been expanded, through the establishment of new Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and notable enforcement initiatives such as Operation Sweet Tooth/Project O’Skillet and Operation Triple Play/Project O’Slider. The result: greater success in seizing illicit drugs crossing the U.S.-Canada border and apprehending those that traffic them.

"Despite our best efforts, drug trafficking still occurs in significant quantities in both directions across the border. The principal illicit substances smuggled across our shared border are MDMA (Ecstasy), cocaine, and marijuana."

Interdiction - Data

(2010 - Weed and Seed program) "The Weed and Seed (W&S) strategy was launched more than 18 years ago by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as a community-based, comprehensive, multiagency approach to law enforcement, crime prevention, and community revitalization in high-crime neighborhoods. Since its start in three demonstration sites, W&S initiatives have been established in hundreds of neighborhoods nationwide. In early 2010, 256 sites were active in 46 states and 2 territories. Beginning around 2007, W&S funding has been limited to 5 years for a given site, with a maximum of $1 million over that time."

(2008 - wiretapping) "The number of wiretaps reported decreased 14 percent in 2008. A total of 1,891 applications were reported as authorized in 2008, including 386 submitted to federal judges and 1,505 to state judges. No applications were denied. Compared to the number approved during 2007, the number of applications reported as approved by federal judges in 2008 fell 16 percent. The number of applications approved by state judges declined 14 percent. Wiretap applications in New York (433 applications), California (418 applications), New Jersey (175 applications), and Florida (102 applications) accounted for 75 percent of all applications approved by state judges."

(2008 - cocaine value and drug trafficking cartels) "As Mexican traffickers wrested control of the most valuable portions of the trafficking chain from the Colombians, Mexico itself has become by far the most important conduit for cocaine entering the United States. Today, some 200 mt of cocaine transits Central America and Mexico annually, bringing some US$6 billion to the regional 'cartels'. As a result, those who control the portions of the Mexican border through which the bulk of the drug passes have gained wealth and power comparable to that commanded by the Colombian cartels in their heyday. These groups command manpower and weaponry sufficient to challenge the state when threatened, including access to military arms and explosives."

(2007 - law enforcement use of aircraft) "During 2007, about 1 in 5 large law enforcement agencies had a specialized aviation unit operating at least one fixed wing plane or helicopter. These 201 aviation units, located in departments of 100 or more sworn officers, employed about 3,400 persons, operated almost 900 aircraft in 46 states and the District of Columbia, and logged an estimated 363,000 flight hours.

"Aviation units spent an estimated total of $300 million in 2007 on aircraft purchases, leasing and financing, and maintenance and fuel.

"Among aviation units operating planes, the three most common functions performed by 80% or more of all units were pilot training (87%), surveillance (84%), and personnel transport (80%). By contrast, over 80% of aviation units using a helicopter engaged in the following seven functions: photographic flights (99%), surveillance (97%), routine patrol or patrol support (93%), fugitive searches (91%), pilot training (90%), search and rescue (90%), and drug location and interdiction (89%)."

(2007 - High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas) "For FY 2007, the most recent year for which data are available, annual reports indicate that there were almost 620 HIDTA [High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas] initiatives in the 28 HIDTAs and five Southwest Border regions. These initiatives identified more than 7,300 DTOs [drug trafficking organizations] operating in their areas: approximately 48% of the identified DTOs trafficked cocaine, about 34% trafficked marijuana, 22% methamphetamine, and 11% heroin. Most are poly-drug DTOs that traffic in more than one illegal substance."

(2007 - High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas) "HIDTAs [High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas] reported disrupting or dismantling 2,873 (83%) of the DTOs that they expected to disrupt or dismantle in FY 2007. More than onehalf (66%) of the disrupted and dismantled DTOs [drug trafficking organizations] were part of a multi-state or international operation. In the process, HIDTA initiatives removed drugs with a wholesale value of more than $26.6 billion from the market, and seized $673 million in cash, and $203 million in noncash assets from drug traffickers."

(2002-2006 - global drug seizures) "The world only intercepts one fifth of the global opiate flows every year, with very mixed performances at the country level. The Islamic Republic of Iran has the highest seizures rate, at 20 per cent. Next are China (18 per cent) and Pakistan (17 per cent). In the two main source countries, Afghanistan and Myanmar, seizures represent only 2 per cent each of the world total. An equally insignificant 2 per cent is seized in South-Eastern Europe, the last segment of the Balkan route to Europe. Along the Northern route (Central Asia - Russia), the interception rate is also low (4-5 per cent)."

(2006 - wiretapping) "The average cost of intercept devices installed in 2006 was $52,551, down 5 percent from the average cost in 2005. For federal wiretaps for which expenses were reported in 2006, the average cost was $67,044, a 5 percent decrease from the average cost in 2005. The average cost of a state wiretap increased 3 percent to $46,687 in 2006."

(2006 - global cocaine trafficking) "Mexico is the main transit country of cocaine shipments to North America. Trafficking to Mexico and further on to the United States declined, however, in 2006 and 2007. About 52% of cocaine was trafficked to Mexico by sea in 2006, another 18% by land from Central America (Guatemala and Belize) and 30% by air. These figures suggest that 2006 saw a decline in trafficking by sea and by land and – in relative terms – an increase in trafficking by air as compared to a year earlier. Aircrafts often bring cocaine into Mexico from Venezuela, Colombia and from countries in Central America, notably Guatemala.¹² Important entry points for cocaine into Mexico by sea continue to be the Pacific region and the peninsula of Yukatan on the Atlantic coast. From there, the drug is usually transported by land northwards. In volume terms, most cocaine shipments are by sea. In terms of cases, most seizures are for deliveries by land. About 90% of the cocaine is destined for the USA, 7% is destined for Europe (often by air to Spain, Belgium, Germany, France and Italy) and 3% is for local consumption.".¹³

(2006 - global seizures of cocaine) "Globally, most cocaine is seized in the Americas (81%). South America, where most cocaine is manufactured, accounted for 45% of global seizures in 2006. North America, the world’s largest cocaine market, accounted for 24%. Central America and the Caribbean, which are major transit regions, accounted for 11 % of global seizures.

"The only large market outside of the Americas is Europe. Seventeen per cent of global cocaine seizures were made in Europe in 2006, and 99 % of these were made in West and Central Europe.

"The rest of the world was responsible for about 2% of global seizures and more than 90% of these were reported by countries in Africa."

(2006 - cocaine trafficking routes) "The world’s main cocaine trafficking routes continue to run from the Andean region, notably Colombia, to the United States. Frequently quoted estimates among enforcement agencies in recent years suggested that some 450 mt of cocaine (46% of production in 2006) may be destined for markets in North America⁵ (trend falling) and some 250 mt (25% of production) for markets in Europe (trend rising).⁶ Most of the remainder is seized in the coca producing countries (215 mt of cocaine base and salt in 2006, or less than 170 mt expressed in pure cocaine) or consumed in South America.⁷

"The US ‘Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement’ (IACM) assumes higher shipment figures of cocaine towards North America. Estimates by the IACM suggest that between 530 and 710 mt of cocaine may have departed South America towards the United States in 2006.⁸ Out of this amount some 90% is thought to have transited the Mexico-Central America Corridor in 2006. The IACM assumes that 66% of the cocaine departing South America towards the USA in 2006 moved through the Eastern Pacific Vector, more than a year earlier (50%)."

(2006 - global seizure of opiates) "Global opiate seizures, expressed in heroin equivalents, increased 14% to 142 mt in 2006. Opiates seizures have grown an average of 9% per year over the last decade, exceeding growth in global opium production. The global interception rate for opiates rose from 13% in 1996 to 23% in 2006."

(2006 - cocaine trafficking and Mexico) "The US authorities estimate that around 90% of the cocaine, which entered their country in 2006, transited the Mexico-Central America corridor. The amounts of cocaine trafficked into the United States declined, however, in 2006 and this trend became more pronounced in 2007 as Mexican authorities stepped up efforts to fight the drug cartels operating on their territory, which also increased the level of cocaine related violence in Mexico. US cocaine seizures along the country’s southern border declined by 20% over the first two quarters of 2007 on a year earlier and by almost 40% in the second quarter of 2007, as compared to the second quarter of 2006. The main entry point of cocaine into the United States continues to be the common border of Mexico with southern Texas (accounting for a third of all seizures along the border with Mexico in 2006), followed by the border with southern California (18%).¹⁴"

(2006 - cocaine interdiction and Africa) "The most striking new trend in cocaine trafficking in recent years has been the rising importance of Africa, notably of West and Central Africa, as a transit area for cocaine shipments to Europe. Seizures made in Africa rose from less than 1 mt over the 1998-2002 period to 15 mt in 2006. Most of the increase took place in 2006. The largest African cocaine seizures were reported by Nigeria, followed by Ghana, South Africa, Morocco and Cap Verde in 2006. In addition, Guinea-Bissau emerged in recent years as an important cocaine trafficking hub. Out of the 33 African countries that provided seizure statistics in 2006 to UNODC, 25 African countries, or 76%, reported seizures of cocaine, up from 34% in 1990.

"African cocaine seizures are now equivalent to 2.1% of the global total, up from 0.3% in 2005 and 0.1% in 2000. Since law enforcement in Africa is hampered by a lack of resources and other important factors, this marked increase may not fully reflect the actual trafficking flows through the region."

(2006 - wiretapping) "Violations of drug laws and homicide/assault were the two most prevalent types of offenses investigated through communications intercepts. Racketeering was the third most frequently recorded offense category, and gambling the fourth. Table 3 indicates that 80 percent of all applications for intercepts (1,473 wiretaps) authorized in 2006 cited a drug offense as the most serious offense under investigation."

(2005 - payments to confidential informants) "DEA officials state that without confidential sources, the DEA could not effectively enforce the controlled substances laws of the United States. Confidential sources come from all walks of life and are significant to initiating investigations and providing information or services to facilitate arrests and seizures of drugs and cash. According to the DEA, it has approximately 4,000 active confidential sources at any one time."

(1998 - cocaine production and interception) "As far as trafficking is concerned, a comparison with the interception rate of opiates in 1998 (17%), makes the interception rate of 46% reported for cocaine for the same year appear extremely high. Assuming a similar volume of seizures in 1999, the rate would be even higher (50%). For the reasons mentioned above, there are thus some doubts about the accuracy of the total potential cocaine production reported during the past few years (765 mt in 1999)."

(1998 - cocaine and Colombia) In spite of US expenditures of $625 million in counter narcotics operations in Colombia between 1990 and 1998, Colombia was able to surpass Peru and Bolivia to become the world's largest coca producer. Additionally, "there has not been a net reduction in processing or exporting refined cocaine from Colombia or in cocaine availability within the United States."

(2007 - price of heroin) In 2007, a kilogram of heroin no. 3 typically sold for an average wholesale price of $2,520 in Pakistan; the average 2005 per-kilogram wholesale price of heroin no. 4 in that country equaled approximately $4,159. The 2007 wholesale price for a kilogram of heroin in Afghanistan ranged around $2,405. In Colombia, a kilogram of heroin no. 4 typically sold for $9,992 wholesale in 2006. In the United States in 2007, a kilogram of heroin no. 4 cost an average of $71,200 wholesale.

Interdiction - Research

(flaws in U.S.-Mexico strategies) "One flaw of current U.S.-Mexico strategy is the false presumption that international trafficking of drugs, guns, and cash can be effectively addressed through interdiction, particularly along the nearly two thousand- mile U.S.-Mexico border. After a three-decade effort to beef up security, the border is more heavily fortified than at any point since the U.S.-Mexico war of 1846–48. The United States has deployed more than twenty thousand border patrol agents and built hundreds of miles of fencing equipped with high-tech surveillance equipment, all at an annual cost of tens of billions of dollars. Although this massive security buildup at the border has yielded the highest possible operational control, the damage to Mexico’s drug cartels caused by border interdiction has been inconsequential.⁴³ Meanwhile, heightened interdiction at the border has had several unintended consequences, including added hassles and delays that obstruct billions of dollars in legitimate commerce each year, the expansion and increased sophistication of cross-border smuggling operations, and greater U.S. vulnerability to attacks and even infiltration by traffickers.⁴⁴ Further efforts to beef up the border through more patrolling and fencing will have diminishing returns, and will likely cause more economic harm than gains in security for the struggling communities of the border region.⁴⁵"

(failure of law enforcement drug intervention) "Based on the available English language scientific evidence, the results of this systematic review suggest that an increase in drug law enforcement interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely to reduce drug market violence. Instead, from an evidence-based public policy perspective and based on several decades of available data, the existing scientific evidence suggests drug law enforcement contributes to gun violence and high homicide rates and that increasingly sophisticated methods of disrupting organizations involved in drug distribution could paradoxically increase violence. In this context, and since drug prohibition has not achieved its stated goals of reducing drug supply, alternative regulatory models for drug control will be required if drug market violence is to be substantially reduced."

Interdiction - Domestic Surveillance

(domestic surveillance - erosion of the Fourth Amendment) "In recent years – in no small part as the result of the failed “war on drugs” – Fourth Amendment principles have been steadily eroding. The circumstances under which police and other government officials may conduct warrantless searches has been rapidly expanding. The courts have allowed for increased surveillance and searches on the nation’s highways and at our “borders” (the legal definition of which actually extends hundreds of miles inland from the actual border). And despite the Constitution’s plain language covering “persons” and “effects,” the courts have increasingly allowed for warrantless searches when we are outside of our homes and “in public.” Here the courts have increasingly found we have no “reasonable expectation” of privacy and that therefore the Fourth Amendment does not apply."

(The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) "The Fourth Amendment provides that

^{"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.}

"In general, the amendment prohibits the government from conducting unreasonable searches or seizures of “the people” and their property, in most cases (subject to a number of exceptions) requiring a warrant supported by a particularized description of the object of the search or seizure.³⁵ The term “search” refers to a governmental infringement of an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable, that is, under circumstances where an individual reasonably expects that the privacy of his or her person, home, papers, or effects are protected from uninvited intrusion.³⁶ A “seizure” occurs when there is meaningful governmental interference in a property interest³⁷ or intentional detention of a person.³⁸ Searches and seizures can involve intangible as well as tangible things.³⁹

"Government surveillance where there is no legitimate expectation of privacy does not amount to a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore carries no requirement for a warrant, probable cause, or even any semblance of reasonableness."

(domestic surveillance - law - thermal imaging) "In Kyllo [v United States], a federal agent used infrared thermal imaging equipment to compare the heat emanating from a triplex unit to the heat signatures of other nearby residences. Based in part on the equipment reading indicating that the defendant’s home was warmer than the others, the agent obtained a search warrant. Officers searched the home and seized marijuana plants growing inside. The government argued that the Fourth Amendment had no application, because the defendant had made no effort to conceal the heat escaping the walls of his home and had no reasonable expectation that passers-by would not take notice.

"The Supreme Court disagreed, 5-4, holding that the use of sense-enhancing technology not in general public use, in order to reveal details about the interior of a private home that could not otherwise be ascertained without entering the home, constitutes a search. The majority placed great emphasis on the fact that the technique was aimed at a private dwelling, yet it is not clear from the decision whether (or why) the use of such technology against a barn or private office should yield a different result."

(domestic surveillance - law - helicopter surveillance) "The Supreme Court addressed whether an observation made from a low-flying helicopter constituted a search in Florida v. Riley,⁵⁸ a plurality concluding that it did not. At issue was the use of a police helicopter, hovering at 400 feet (an altitude prohibited for fixed-wing aircraft), to observe, through an opening in a greenhouse roof, marijuana growing inside. The plurality read [California v.] Ciraolo as establishing that so long as there was no breach of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) safety regulations, the property owner had no legitimate reason to expect privacy with respect to non-intimate activities undertaken in the curtilage of his home that were plainly visible from above. Five justices would have preferred to consider how often members of the public actually make low-altitude helicopter flights over populated areas in determining whether the claimed expectation of privacy was reasonable. The plurality suggested that surveillance overflights that comply with FAA regulations might nevertheless constitute searches if they were to involve “undue noise, [] wind, dust, or threat of injury” or to reveal “intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage.”⁹"

(domestic surveillance - Patriot Act) "Although the United States has a history of reactionary and repressive behavior in a crisis,²²¹ the USA PATRIOT Act (“Unifying and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism”) may prove to be the broadest, wholesale threat to civil liberties in the nation’s history. Passed just six weeks after the September 11 attacks, without congressional hearings and floor debate,²²² the voluminous piece of legislation grants to law enforcement many coveted, but previously rejected, powers.²²³ Since most of its provisions amend and modify existing laws, it is a bill that cannot be read, but only deciphered and analyzed."

(domestic surveillance - information gathering on peaceful activities) "A secret Pentagon database obtained by NBC News, parts of which were published in December 2005, had revealed that nearly four dozen peaceful political gatherings, most of which were aimed at protesting military recruitment or the war in Iraq, were included among more than 1500 “suspicious incidents” reported across the United States. (Lisa Myers et al., Is The Pentagon Spying on Americans? MSNBC.com, Dec. 14, 2005.) Subsequent news reports revealed that a highly secretive component of the Department of Defense, the Counterintelligence Field Activity Agency (“CIFA”), had been accumulating and maintaining information about domestic organizations and their peaceful political activities. CIFA, whose size and budget are classified, had been directed to track “potential terrorist threats” against the Department of Defense through reports known as Threat and Local Observation Notices (“TALON”)."

(domestic surveillance - agency that dismantles drug trafficking organizations) "OCDETF [Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force] is a Department of Justice program that seeks to combine resources and expertise of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to identify, disrupt, and dismantle organizations responsible for drug trafficking.²⁸ According to the OCDETF website, OCDETF targets not only the drug operations, but also the “tools of the trade” for these organizations, including money laundering and firearms trafficking.

"When a case has been designated as an OCDETF case, the costs of the investigation – including travel, wiretaps, confidential informant subsistence, and other evidence-gathering expenses – may be reimbursed by the OCDETF Program, depending on funding availability. To have a case approved as an OCDETF case, an agency presents it to other agencies involved in the program, including the USAO [United States Attorneys’ Offices] with jurisdiction in the area. Once the case is vetted by a federal prosecutor designated to support the OCDETF Program, it is presented to one of nine regional OCDETF committees, which must give final approval before the program’s resources are dedicated to the case.

"The OCDETF Program also establishes task forces (which it refers to as strike forces) to permanently co-locate representatives from federal law enforcement agencies, along with representatives of state and local law enforcement, in a city. The participating agencies, including ATF when it chooses to do so, work together to investigate trafficking organizations. OCDETF task forces are currently located in San Diego, Phoenix, El Paso, Houston (including satellite offices in Laredo and McAllen), Tampa, San Juan, Atlanta, New York, and Boston."

(domestic surveillance - fusion centers and task forces) "As modern law enforcement operations have become increasingly intelligence-led, agencies have come to rely heavily on fusion centers and task forces. According to DHS [Department of Homeland Security], fusion centers and task forces (with specific reference to Joint Terrorism Task Forces, or JTTFs) serve “distinct, but complementary roles.”¹⁴⁸ Fusion centers have been defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”¹⁴⁹ DHS has indicated that

^{[F]usion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners. They produce actionable intelligence for dissemination, which can aid other law enforcement organizations, including the JTTFs, in their investigative operations.150}

"While fusion centers are generally intelligence-based, law enforcement task forces appear to be generally operational in nature.¹⁵¹ These multi-jurisdictional entities are established to counter a specific threat such as violent gangs¹⁵² or online fraud.¹⁵³ The sections below discuss selected fusion centers and task forces."

(domestic surveillance - intelligence agencies) "EPIC[*] is a fully coordinated, multi-agency tactical intelligence center supported by databases and resources from member agencies. Its online query capability consists of 33 federal databases, six commercial databases, and its own internal database. It operates a 24/7 watch program manned by special agents, investigative assistants, and intelligence analysts to provide timely tactical intelligence in support of field operations."

* EPIC (El Paso Intelligence Center) is "charged with consolidating and disseminating intelligence on various organized crime matters" and is one of "several federal agencies [that] investigate and record information on bulk cash smuggling."

(domestic surveillance - data mining) "There has been a massive shift from surveillance and intelligence-gathering based on a factual predicate—such as specific information or a lead about a suspicious person or event—to surveillance and intelligence-gathering intended to obtain vast troves of data on millions of people. The NSA has been given authority to acquire and analyze the international calls and e-mails of Americans in the U.S., an intelligence activity that was formerly conducted by the FBI. The latter traditionally investigated based on some factual predicate; the NSA “vacuums” information in the hope that it may be useful in the future. Turning the NSA’s supercomputing capabilities inward on Americans, when they were previously directed outward towards foreigners overseas, is an enormous change. In addition, the intelligence agencies not only collect, but also retain billions of items of data on Americans on the theory that they may be useful in the future, including data gathered by commercial entities as well as that collected by the government directly."

(domestic surveillance - data aggregators) "Data companies collect information from courthouses and other public sources, as well as marketing data – sometimes including extremely personal information ..."

"... And the government is, in fact, buying information from these companies. One of the biggest data aggregators, for example, Choicepoint, claims to have contracts with at least 35 government agencies. It has an $8 million contract with the Justice Department that allows FBI agents to tap into the company’s vast database of personal information on individuals, as well as contracts with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Marshals Service, the IRS, the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly INS) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms."

(domestic surveillance - confidential informants) "Drug law enforcement in the United States has grown highly dependent upon the wholesale use of confidential informants (CIs), who are frequently lawbreakers in their own right. Driven by skewed police performance metrics and draconian sentencing policies, and corrupted through perverse incentives coupled with nonexistent oversight, the informant system as operated is antithetical to basic fairness, the proper administration of the justice system, and truly effective law enforcement. The pervasive abuse of the informant system, often by federally funded drug task forces, has had tragic implications for individuals and communities nationwide. Disproportionately targeted by drug law enforcement efforts, African American communities have, unsurprisingly, borne the brunt of this injustice."

(domestic surveillance - consequences) "If we do not take steps to control and regulate surveillance to bring it into conformity with our values, we will find ourselves being tracked, analyzed, profiled, and flagged in our daily lives to a degree we can scarcely imagine today. We will be forced into an impossible struggle to conform to the letter of every rule, law, and guideline, lest we create ammunition for enemies in the government or elsewhere. Our transgressions will become permanent Scarlet Letters that follow us throughout our lives, visible to all and used by the government, landlords, employers, insurance companies and other powerful parties to increase their leverage over average people. Americans will not be able to engage in political protest or go about their daily lives without the constant awareness that we are – or could be – under surveillance. We will be forced to constantly ask of even the smallest action taken in public, “Will this make me look suspicious? Will this hurt my chances for future employment? Will this reduce my ability to get insurance?” The exercise of free speech will be chilled as Americans become conscious that their every word may be reported to the government by FBI infiltrators, suspicious fellow citizens or an Internet Service Provider."

Interdiction - Drugs and Terrorism

(drugs and terrorism - devastation to civil liberties) "Well before the twenty-first century, the 9/11/01 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the resulting War on Terror, the country and Supreme Court already had been fighting another war for thirty years—the so-called “War on Drugs”—and it was every bit as devastating to civil liberties, although slower and more methodical, than our new “War on Terror” promises to be."

(drugs and terrorism - failings that led to 9/11) "The office’s [Federal Bureau of Investigation's] priorities were driven by two primary concerns. First, performance in the Bureau was generally measured against statistics such as numbers of arrests, indictments, prosecutions, and convictions. Counterterrorism and counterintelligence work, often involving lengthy intelligence investigations that might never have positive or quantifiable results, was not career-enhancing. Most agents who reached management ranks had little counterterrorism experience. Second, priorities were driven at the local level by the field offices, whose concerns centered on traditional crimes such as white-collar offenses and those pertaining to drugs and gangs. Individual field offices made choices to serve local priorities, not national priorities."

(drugs and terrorism - failings that led to 9/11) "Although the FBI’s counterterrorism budget tripled during the mid-1990s, FBI counterterrorism spending remained fairly constant between fiscal years 1998 and 2001. In 2000, there were still twice as many agents devoted to drug enforcement as to counterterrorism."

(drugs and terrorism - drug financing of Al Qaeda) "Al Qaeda has been alleged to have used a variety of illegitimate means, particularly drug trafficking and conflict diamonds, to finance itself. While the drug trade was a source of income for the Taliban, it did not serve the same purpose for al Qaeda, and there is no reliable evidence that Bin Ladin was involved in or made his money through drug trafficking."

(drugs and terrorism - counternarcotics trafficking in Afghanistan) "Since the late 1990s, the US policy has linked its counternarcotics policy with counterterrorism policy in Afghanistan. However, there is modest proof of a direct involvement by Al Qaida in the international drug trafficking network. The 9-11 Commission found little evidence to confirm this accusation. Groups known to be involved in the illicit drug economy were rather the Sunni Hizb-i Islami group of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Taliban. [37] However, according to the World Bank and UNODC, the Taliban derived more income and foreign exchange in the period 1996-2000 from taxing smuggled goods from Dubai to Pakistan than from the drug industry. Even now, the Taliban have several sources of income and they are not economically dependent on the narcotics trade only. [38] This reality, however, has not stopped the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to argue that “fighting drug trafficking equals fighting terrorism”.[39]"

(drugs and terrorism - rhetoric) "Like the war on terror, the war on drugs is framed as a response to an exceptional, existential threat to our health, our security, and indeed the very fabric of society. The “Addiction to narcotic drugs” is portrayed as an “evil” the international community has a moral duty to “combat” because it is a “danger of incalculable gravity” that warrants a series of (otherwise publicly unacceptable) extraordinary measures ... This crusading language has created a political climate in which drug war policy and enforcement are not required to meet human rights norms."

(drugs and terrorism - definition of a narco-terrorist) "According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), a narco-terrorist organization is “an organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets with the intention to influence [that is, influence a government or a group of people].”²³⁸

(drugs and terrorism - the Patriot Act) "Passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act)¹¹ followed shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City, Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania. This legislation substantially increased the authority of the government in surveillance,¹² border security,¹³ terrorism policing,¹⁴ money laundering policing,¹⁵ and intelligence gathering.¹⁶ Simply put, '[s]ince the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the nation has fought a war against terrorism.'"

(drugs and terrorism - deterioration of privacy and civil liberties) "After the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, we now have the Department of Homeland Security and the USA PATRIOT Act.¹⁹ In addition to the prolonged detention of persons, obliquely labeled “enemy combatants,” without lawyers or any kind of due process,²⁰ the PATRIOT Act has brought, among other things, sneak-and-peek²¹ and nationwide search warrants,²² roving wiretaps,²³ surveillance of computer communication,²⁴ application of streamlined foreign intelligence surveillance procedures to domestic criminal investigations,²⁵ and perusal of library and book records.²⁶ Still worse, we are utilizing torture to interrogate detainees, which is apparently authorized at the highest levels of the U.S government.²⁷

"As the country has meandered to the right politically in the past thirty to thirty-five years, a steady deterioration of privacy protection and civil liberties has developed. First, methodically and largely unnoticed in the name of the War on Drugs, and now more rapidly and apparent in the War on Terrorism, our free, open society is casually losing its grip."

(drugs and terrorism - depiction of these wars on television) "This research suggests that primetime TV is often reflective of public opinion in the United States about the War on Terror and the War on Drugs. These shows depict the struggle involved in fighting these wars, but by shifting the emphasis away from arrests, trials and convictions – the bread and butter of pre-9/11 crime shows – they rarely depict the justice ultimately being done by them. This reflects the deep ambivalence about these wars that can be found in public opinion polls. A majority of Americans believe the War on Drugs has been a failure, but, with the exception of marijuana, support for legalizing drugs is still very low. In the case of the War on Terror, 69% of Americans give the government positive marks for reducing the terror threat, but only 37% believe that we haven’t had an attack in the U.S. since 2001 because the government is doing a good job (most respondents say we’ve just been “lucky so far.”)³⁰ Sentiment about the Patriot Act is decidedly mixed as well, with 42% saying it is a “necessary tool” and 34% saying it “goes too far.”²⁹ And the most recent “report card” on the status of the 9/11 Commission recommendations was decidedly mixed, finding that the U.S. is “undoubtedly safer” although many important recommendations from the 2004 report remain unfulfilled.³¹"

(interdiction - federal agencies that investigate and enforce drug laws) The following table displays agencies of the United States Government that investigate, collect information, conduct surveillance and enforce laws concerning the trafficking and money laundering of illicit drugs. This list may not be all inclusive.

^{† "Agencies participating in the NJTTF include Air Force Office of Special Investigations; Army Criminal Investigative Command; Army Intelligence and Security Command; ATF [Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms; CBP [Customs and Border Protection; DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration]; Defense Criminal Investigative Service; Defense HUMINT (human intelligence) Services; Defense Intelligence Agency; Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DHS [Department of Homeland Security]; DoD [Department of Defense]; DOJ [Department of Justice]; Environmental Protection Agency; FBI; Federal Air Marshal Service; Federal Bureau of Prisons; Federal Protective Service; ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement]; Internal Revenue Service; Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C.; National Railroad Police; Naval Criminal Investigative Service; New York City Police Department; Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Personnel Management; Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration; TSA [Transportation Security Administration]; U.S. Capitol Police; U.S. Department of Agriculture; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; U.S. Department of the Interior; U.S. Department of State; U.S. Department of Transportation; U.S. Department of the Treasury; U.S. Food and Drug Administration; U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM); U.S. Marshals Service; U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM); U.S. Postal Inspection Service; U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM); USCG [United States Coast Guard]; and USSS [United States Secret Service]."}