Militarization of Drug Enforcement
| Brief Chronology of Domestic Military Involvement |
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"The US Congress approved in July 2000 an emergency supplemental
assistance request for fiscal years 2000-2001 of $1.32 billion, of
which $862.3 million was allocated to Colombia and the balance to
neighboring countries (primarily Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador) and to
US agencies' Andean region antidrug operations. Of the $862.3
million allocated to Colombia, $521.2 million is new assistance
to the Colombian armed forces and $123.1 is assistance to the
police, with the rest ($218 million) going to alternative
economic development, aid to displaced persons, judicial reform,
law enforcement, and promotion of human rights.
"The bulk of the military assistance will support the Colombian armed forces' three counter-narcotics battalions, which are to receive 16 UH-60 Black Hawk and 30 UH-1H Huey transport helicopters."Source: Rabasa, Angel & Peter Chalk, "Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Instability" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), pp. 62-3, from the web at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339/, last accessed August 11, 2002.
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"Although US assistance is provided for counter-narcotics
purposes only, there is a clear linkage between the Colombian
government's counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency strategies.
the Colombian government believes that, by striking at the drug
trade, it also strikes at the economic center of gravity of the
guerrillas. That is, by destroying the coca and poppy fields,
drug-production facilities, and transportation networks, the
government can also degrade the guerrillas' ability to carry on
the war.
"Whether this is an accurate assessment remains to be seen."Source: Rabasa, Angel & Peter Chalk, "Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Instability" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 65, from the web at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339/, last accessed August 11, 2002.
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"The FARC clearly believes that US counter-narcotics assistance
is directed against it, that it is, in effect, disguised counter-
insurgency assistance, and that if they, the guerrillas, were to
gain the upper hand, the United States would intervene on the side
of the Bogota government. Therefore, in its public posture, the
FARC has stressed the threat that US military assistance to Colombia
poses to the peace process, a theme that plays well with some
domestic and international audiences. The FARC professes to be
opposed in principle to the narcotics trade, while criticizing the
methods employed by the Colombian government -- aerial spraying
in particular. It has also sought to forestall direct US
intervention by drawing parallels between Colombia and Vietnam."
Source: Rabasa, Angel & Peter Chalk, "Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Instability" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 68, from the web at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339/, last accessed August 11, 2002.
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"Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and
allied assets spent on interdiction operations in the transit
zone —- as measured in on-station ship days and flight hours -—
has varied. U.S. and allied on-station ship days decreased from approximately 3,600 days in fiscal year 2000 to about 3,300
in fiscal year 2005, and U.S. and allied on-station flight
hours increased from approximately 10,500 hours in fiscal year
2000 to almost 12,900 in fiscal year 2005. However, on-station
ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in
fiscal year 2002, but both have generally declined since then,
primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in
Defense assets were largely offset by the Coast Guard, CBP
US Bureau for Customs and Border Protection), and several
allied European nations -— France, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, with the assets available in
recent years, JIATF-South (Joint Interagency Task Force-South)
reports that it detected (made visual contact with) less than
one-third of the known maritime drug movements."
Source: "Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Decline in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations," Government Accountability Office (Washington, DC: USGAO, Nov. 2005), GAO-06-200, p. 4.
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Eighty-nine percent (89%) of police departments have paramilitary units, and 46% have been trained by active duty armed forces. The most common use of paramilitary units is serving drug-related search warrants (usually no-knock entries into private homes). Twenty percent (20%) of police departments use paramilitary units to patrol urban areas.
Source: Kraska, P. & Kappeler, V., "Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of Paramilitary Units," Social Problems, Vol. 44, No. 1 (February 1997).
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In 1996 "Drug Czar" Retired General Barry McCaffrey said of the Drug War, "It makes us all very uncomfortable to see uniformed military units getting heavily involved."
Source: McGee, J., "Military Seeks Balance in Delicate Mission: The Drug War," Washington Post, (November 29, 1996).
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On February 15, 2000, before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Gen. McCaffrey testified about sending military aid to Colombia to fight their drug war: "Military support will be required to provide a sufficient level of security for the CNP (Colombian National Police) to perform their law enforcement mission. The proposed assistance package would enable the Colombian Army to operate jointly with the CNP as they move into the dangerous drug production sanctuaries in southern Colombian by providing funds to stand up two additional Army Counternarcotics Battalions. The first Army Counternarcotics Battalion, which was trained and equipped by the US, was brought on line in late 1999."
Source: Testimony of ONDCP Director McCaffrey, February 15, 2000, before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, from the ONDCP website at www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/testimony/021500/index.html