"The election year of 1996 marked the highest percentage of federal funds allocated to drug enforcement during the decade. The Clinton administration appointed former SOUTHCOM CINC, Gen (Ret) Barry McCaffery to the office of Director, National Drug Control Policy. Following the mandate of the President and Congress, the Cabinet level office maintained the 70/30 ratios between supply and demand reduction programs with the exception of 1999 and 2000. Programs that represented a traditional supply control approach included Presidential decertifications of Colombia, followed by the support of Plan Colombia."

"There was no political or scientific-medical consensus for the policy designs that developed into national programs in the 1990s. Studies failed to address the political dimension of the drug control policy."

"Electoral politics was the reason why the preponderance of federal fiscal dollars resourced supply programs higher rather than demand reduction programs. The United States drug policy has been driven by the need to appear tough on drugs, regardless of results. Cocaine and heroin cost are declining and product purity is rising. Presidential leadership has a value, however, pressures to compromise may mitigate effectiveness. Political activism by an informed electorate to help shape the direction of public policy is needed."

"According to the National Review, when [General Barry] McCaffery retired from the military in 1996 to become Director, Office of the National Drug Control Policy, ONDCP, he was the youngest and most decorated four-star general in the Army. His appointment helped the administration’s new commitment to the get-tough approach.80 'The appointment was widely seen as a direct response to Republican election –year criticisms that the president was soft on drugs.'"

"The US Congress approved in July 2000 an emergency supplemental assistance request for fiscal years 2000-2001 of $1.32 billion, of which $862.3 million was allocated to Colombia and the balance to neighboring countries (primarily Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador) and to US agencies' Andean region antidrug operations. Of the $862.3 million allocated to Colombia, $521.2 million is new assistance to the Colombian armed forces and $123.1 is assistance to the police, with the rest ($218 million) going to alternative economic development, aid to displaced persons, judicial reform, law enforcement, and promotion of human rights. "The bulk of the military assistance will support the Colombian armed forces' three counter-narcotics battalions, which are to receive 16 UH-60 Black Hawk and 30 UH-1H Huey transport helicopters."

"Although US assistance is provided for counter-narcotics purposes only, there is a clear linkage between the Colombian government's counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency strategies. the Colombian government believes that, by striking at the drug trade, it also strikes at the economic center of gravity of the guerrillas. That is, by destroying the coca and poppy fields, drug-production facilities, and transportation networks, the government can also degrade the guerrillas' ability to carry on the war. "Whether this is an accurate assessment remains to be seen."

"The FARC clearly believes that US counter-narcotics assistance is directed against it, that it is, in effect, disguised counter- insurgency assistance, and that if they, the guerrillas, were to gain the upper hand, the United States would intervene on the side of the Bogota government. Therefore, in its public posture, the FARC has stressed the threat that US military assistance to Colombia poses to the peace process, a theme that plays well with some domestic and international audiences. The FARC professes to be opposed in principle to the narcotics trade, while criticizing the methods employed by the Colombian government -- aerial spraying in particular. It has also sought to forestall direct US intervention by drawing parallels between Colombia and Vietnam."

"Since fiscal year 2000, the availability of U.S. and allied assets spent on interdiction operations in the transit zone —- as measured in on-station ship days and flight hours -— has varied. U.S. and allied on-station ship days decreased from approximately 3,600 days in fiscal year 2000 to about 3,300 in fiscal year 2005, and U.S. and allied on-station flight hours increased from approximately 10,500 hours in fiscal year 2000 to almost 12,900 in fiscal year 2005. However, on-station ship days peaked in fiscal year 2001 and flight hours peaked in fiscal year 2002, but both have generally declined since then, primarily because Defense has provided fewer assets. Declines in Defense assets were largely offset by the Coast Guard, CBP US Bureau for Customs and Border Protection), and several allied European nations -— France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, with the assets available in recent years, JIATF-South (Joint Interagency Task Force-South) reports that it detected (made visual contact with) less than one-third of the known maritime drug movements."